

Message Text

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ACTION OES-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 SOE-02 DODE-00
SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 PM-05 /103 W
-----000048 131729Z /43

P 131437Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7158
USDOEHQ WASHDC PRIORITY
USDOEHQ GERMANTOWN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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USIAEA

USEEC ALSO FOR EMBASSY
DEPT PASS IO/SCT AND S/AS AND OES/NET
DOE PASS BENGELSDORF, IA, AND LYON, SS

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: IAEA, EEC, PARM, MNUC, TECH
SUBJECT: IAEA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS -- ALMELO ENRICHMENT
PLANT

1. SUMMARY: IN CONNECTION WITH DEFINING AN EXCLUSION
AREA FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS IN THE FACILITY
ATTACHMENT BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE ALMELO URANIUM
ENRICHMENT PLANT, DDG ROMETSCH SEEKS CLARIFICATION FROM
THE U.S. ON URGENT BASIS RE ITS UNDERSTANDING OR
AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG (AND POSSIBLY THE OTHER
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TRIPARTITE MEMBERS) ON SPECIFICALLY WHAT AREAS SHOULD
BE EXCLUDED FROM ACCESS BY IAEA INSPECTORS. END SUMMARY.

2. IAEA TEAM LED BY DDG ROMETSCH AND ACCOMPANIED BY
DR. HANS GRUEMM (WHO WILL REPLACE ROMETSCH AS OF
SEPTEMBER 1), VISITED ALMELO ON JULY 5 FOR FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS ON FACILITY ATTACHMENT FOR ALMELO ENRICHMENT

PLANT. APPROXIMATELY 20 OFFICIALS FROM THE THREE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN THE ALMELO PLANT WERE PRESENT. THE VISIT INCLUDED A QUICK (15 MINUTE) WALK THROUGH THE 200-TON PLANT, BUT NOT RPT NOT WITHIN THE BRICK WALLS AROUND THE CASCADE AREA WHERE THE CENTRIFUGES ARE LOCATED, WHICH COMPRISES ABOUT 70 TO 80 PERCENT OF THE AREA OF THE PLANT. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ONLY SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS WHO HAVE BEEN ALLOWED IN THIS AREA ARE EURATOM INSPECTORS WHO ARE EITHER U.K., DUTCH OR FRG NATIONALS.)

3. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH MISOFF, ROMETSCH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DEFINING THE EXCLUSION AREA FOR SUCH A SENSITIVE FACILITY (WHICH IS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 46 B (III) OF THE IAEA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT) IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT, BUT HE SAID THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ON TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES: (A) THE EXCLUSION AREA SHOULD BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PREVENT ACCESS TO SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY AND A CONSEQUENT RISK OF PROLIFERATION OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY THROUGH IAEA INSPECTORS; AND (B) THE EXCLUSION AREA SHOULD PERMIT SUFFICIENT ACCESS TO IAEA INSPECTORS TO CARRY OUT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS; E.G., IT SHOULD AVOID PLACING IAEA IN A POSITION OF BEING ACCUSED OF NOT RPT NOT BEING ABLE TO VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY WHETHER OR NOT DIVERSION HAS OCCURRED. CONFIDENTIAL

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4. TO ILLUSTRATE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PRINCIPLES, ROMETSCH NOTED THAT THERE ARE TWO LARGE DOORS ON ONE SIDE OF THE CASCADE AREA PLANT THROUGH WHICH TRUCKS, SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TO CARRY A 5-TON CYLINDER OF UF₆, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD ENTER OR DEPART. IAEA WILL REQUIRE SOME METHOD OF VERIFYING THE CONTENTS OF THESE TRUCKS. BASICALLY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR IAEA TO BE ABLE TO CHECK ALL THE FEED, TAILS, AND PRODUCT GOING IN OR OUT OF THE PLANT. HE SAID THAT THERE IS A DANGER OF PROLIFERATING SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, HOWEVER, IF IAEA VERIFICATION TAKES INSPECTORS TOO FAR INTO THE HEART OF THE PROCESS. HE HAS DEVELOPED A PROPOSAL (OUTLINED BELOW) WHICH HE FEELS WOULD REDUCE SUCH ACCESS BY INSPECTORS TO A MINIMUM, WHILE PERMITTING EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE IAEA SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION.

5. ROMETSCH SAID THAT, FOLLOWING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS INVOLVED, HE PROPOSED THAT THE LIMITS OF EXCLUSION AREA BE DEFINED AS THE EXTERIOR HOUSINGS OF

THE CENTRIFUGES WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE CASCADE AREA OF THE PLANT. THIS WOULD PERMIT IAEA INSPECTORS TO CHECK THE LAYOUT AND INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRIFUGES DURING PERIODIC DESIGN VERIFICATION OR RE-VERIFICATION VISITS, WITH ADVANCE NOTICE, BY IAEA INSPECTORS. THE FREQUENCY OF SUCH VISITS WOULD DEPEND ON ENGINEERING STUDIES DESIGNED TO ESTIMATE THE MINIMUM TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THAT AREA OF THE PLANT. HIS OFF-HAND ESTIMATE WAS ABOUT 4 TIMES PER YEAR. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THIS KIND OF ARRANGEMENT

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WOULD NOT RPT NOT ONLY BE COST EFFECTIVE, BUT WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISK OF PROLIFERATING SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. HE POINTS OUT THAT THERE IS A PUBLISHED BROCHURE SHOWING A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE OUTER HOUSING OF A CENTRIFUGE, WHICH HE USES TO SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT THAT ACCESS TO SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INVOLVED. (IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WERE ALSO INFORMED SEPARATELY BY AN IAEA STAFF MEMBER THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL BLOWN UP PHOTOS OF CENTRIFUGES ON SOME WALLS OF THE PLANT, PRESUMABLY FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PURPOSES, AND THAT PHOTOS OF CENTRIFUGES HAVE ALSO BEEN PUBLISHED IN NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND NUCLEAR NEWS.)

6. ROMETSCH SAID THERE IS A DIVISION OF OPINION AMONG THE ALMELO "TROIKA" OVER HIS PROPOSAL, WITH THE MAIN

OBSTACLE BEING THE FRG, WHICH MAINTAINS THAT THEY WOULD
LIKE TO GO ALONG WITH SUCH A PROPOSAL, BUT ARE NOT RPT
NOT ABLE TO BECAUSE OF AN UNDERSTANDING OR AGREEMENT
WITH THE U.S. (BASED ON SEPARATE INFO OBTAINED FROM AN
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AGENCY STAFF MEMBER, THE U.K. REPORTEDLY SHARES THE FRG
VIEW). THE OPPONENTS OF ROMETSCH'S PROPOSAL BELIEVE
THE EXCLUSION AREA SHOULD BE EVERYTHING WITHIN THE
BRICK WALLS OF THE CASCADE AREA.

7. BEFORE MOVING ANY FURTHER, ROMETSCH HAS ASKED US TO
REPORT FOREGOING AND SEEK CLARIFICATION RE U.S. VIEWS
ON THIS MATTER, SINCE HE WISHES TO AVOID A POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. ON THE ISSUE. PLEASE
ADVISE SOONEST. KIRK

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, NUCLEAR SAFETY, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978VIENNA06337
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780287-0653
Format: TEL
From: VIENNA USIAEA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780761/aaaabzva.tel
Line Count: 190
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4d1f9e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION OES
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2013199
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IAEA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS -- ALMELO ENRICHMENT PLANT
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TECH, IAEA, EEC
To: STATE COM
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4d1f9e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014